We propose a way of reasoning about minimal and maximal values of the weights of transitions in a weighted transition system (WTS). This perspective induces a notion of bisimulation that is coarser than the classic bisimulation: it relates states that exhibit transitions to bisimulation classes with the weights within the same boundaries. We propose a customized modal logic that expresses these numeric boundaries for transition weights by means of particular modalities. We prove that our logic is invariant under the proposed notion of bisimulation. We show that the logic enjoys the finite model property which allows us to prove the decidability of satisfiability and provide an algorithm for satisfiability checking. Last but not least, we identify a complete axiomatization for this logic. All our results are proven for a class of WTSs without the image-finiteness restriction, a fact that makes this development general and robust.
Introduction
Weighted transition systems (WTSs) are used to model concurrent and distributed systems in the case where some resources are involved, such as time, bandwidth, fuel, or energy consumption. Recently, the concept of a cyber-physical system (CPS), which considers the integration of computation and the physical world has become relevant in modeling various real-life situations. In these models, sensor feedback affects computation, and through machinery, computation can further affect physical processes. The quantitative nature of weighted transition systems is well-suited for the quantifiable inputs and sensor measurements of CPSs, but their rigidity makes them less well-suited for the uncertainty inherent in CPSs. In practice, there is often some uncertainty attached to the resource cost, whereas weights in a WTS are precise. Thus, the model may be too restrictive and unable to capture the uncertainties inherent in the domain that is being modeled.
In this paper, we attempt to remedy this shortcoming by introducing a modal logic for WTSs that allows for approximate reasoning by speaking about upper and lower bounds for the weights of the transitions. The logic has two types of modal operators that reason about the minimal and maximal weights on transitions, respectively. This allows reasoning about models where the quantitative information may be imprecise (e.g. due to imprecisions introduced when gathering real data), but where we can establish a lower and upper bound for transitions.
In order to provide the semantics for this logic, we use the set of possible transition weights from one state to a set of states as an abstraction of the actual transition weights. The logic is expressive enough to characterize WTSs up to a relaxed notion of weighted bisimilarity, where the classical conditions are replaced with conditions requiring that the minimal and maximal weights on transitions are matched. This logical characterization works for a class of WTSs that is strictly larger than the class of image-finite WTSs.
In [Ési14] , ZoltánÉsik also considered the issue of bisimulation for weighted transition systems, although in the more general setting of syncronization trees with weights in an arbitrary monoid or semiring. Synchronization trees arise by unfolding the transitions of a weighted transition system starting in some state which will become the root of the tree. BothÉsik's and our notion of bisimilarity bears some resemblance to probabilistic bisimulation [LS91] , by considering not only single transitions but transitions to equivalence classes of states. However, while we require that the upper and lower bounds of these transitions should match, the bisimilarity ofÉsik requires that the sum of the transitions should be the same. This is motivated by the fact that the synchronization trees do not form a category which respects the additive structure of a semiring. However, asÉsik proves, if one takes the quotient with respect to his version of weighted bisimilarity, then the category one obtains does respect the additive structure. Thus, the semiring structure of the weights is of vital importance toÉsik's work, but is an aspect that we have not considered in our work.
Our main contribution is a complete axiomatization of our logic, showing that any validity in this logic can be proved as a theorem from the axiomatic system. Completeness allows us to transform any validity checking problem into a theorem proving one that can be solved automatically by modern theorem provers, thus bridging the gap to the theorem proving community. The completeness proof adapts the classical filtration method, which allows one to construct a (canonical) model using maximal consistent sets of formulae. The main difficulty of adapting this method to our setting is that we must establish both lower and upper bounds for the transitions in this model.
To achieve this result, we firstly demonstrate that our logic enjoys the finite model property. This property allows us not only to achieve the completeness proof, but also to address the problem of decidability of satisfiability. This is our second significant contribution in this paper: we propose a decision procedure for determining the satisfiability of formulae in our logic. This decision procedure makes use of the finite model property to automatically generate a finite model for any satisfiable formula.
Related Work. Several logics have been proposed in the past to express properties of quantified (weighted, probabilistic or stochastic) systems. They typically use modalities indexed with real numbers to express properties such as "ϕ holds with at least probability b", "we can reach a state satisfying ϕ with a cost at least r", etc.
In the context of weighted automata, weighted monadic second order logic has been introduced by Droste and Gastin [DG05] to capture the behaviour of weighted automata for commutative semirings. This work has been extended to many closely related systems [Fic11] . There has also been work on connecting weighted monadic second order logic with probabilistic CTL [BG09] . For weighted transition systems, weighted modal logic has been introduced by Larsen and Mardare [LM14] to reason about the consumption of resources in such a system. This logic has been extended to handle recursion [LMX14b] [LMX14a] as well as parallel composition and concurrency [LMX15b] . For both the original weighted modal logic and its concurrent extension, complete axiomatizations were developed. A weighted extension of the µ-calculus was introduced by Larsen et al. in [LMX15a] , where a complete axiomatization for this extension was also given.
While our setting is that of weighted transition systems, our logic and the development of its theory has more in common with Markovian logics than with the previously mentioned work on weighted systems. Markovian logic was introduced by Mardare Markovian logics reason about probabilistic and stochastic systems using operators L r and M r which mean that a property hold with at least probability r or at most probability r, respectively. Much of the work on Markovian logics have focused on giving a complete axiomatization for the logic [KMP13] , culminating in a Stone duality for Markov processes [KLMP13] . However, compositional aspects have also been considered in [CLM11b] , where also an axiomatization was giving for Markovian logic with an operator for parallel composition.
While our logical syntax resembles that of Markovian logics, our semantics is different in the sense that we argue not about probabilities, but about a compact interval of possible weights. For instance, in the aforementioned logics we have a validity of type ⊢ ¬L r φ → M r φ saying that the value of the transition from the current state to φ is either at least r or at most r; on the other hand, in our logic the formula ¬L r φ ∧ ¬M r φ might have a model since L r φ and M r φ express the fact that the lower cost of a transition to φ is at least r and the highest cost is at most r respectively.
Our completeness proof uses a technique similar to the one used for weighted modal logic [LM14] and Markovian logic [KMP13] [MCL12] [CLM11a] . It is however different from these related constructions since our axiomatization is finitary, while the aforementioned ones require infinitary proof rules. Our axiomatic systems are related to the ones mentioned above and the mathematical structures revealed by this work are also similar to the related ones. This suggest a natural extension towards a Stone duality result along the lines of [KLMP13] , which we will consider in a future work.
Decidability results regarding satisfiabilitys have been given for some related logics too, such as weighted modal logics [LMX16] and probabilistic versions of CTL and the µ-calculus [CK16] . However, the satisfiability problem is known to be undecidable for other related logics, in particular timed logics such as TCTL [ACD93] and timed modal logic [JLMX14] . This fact suggests that our logic is an interesting one which, despite its expressivity, remains decidable.
Our approach of considering upper and lower bounds is related to interval-based formalisms such as interval Markov chains (IMCs) [JL91] and interval weighted modal transition systems (WMTSs) [JLS12] . Much like our approach, IMCs consider upper and lower bounds on transitions in the probabilistic case. WMTSs add intervals of weights to individual transitions of modal transition systems, in which there can be both may-and must-transitions. A main focus of the work both on IMCs and WMTSs have been a process of refinement, making the intervals progressively smaller until an implementation is obtained. However, none of these works have explored the logical perspective up to the level of axiomatization or satisfiability results, which is the focus of our paper.
Model
The models addressed in this paper are weighted transition systems, in which transitions are labeled with numbers to specify the cost of the corresponding transition. In order to specify and reason about properties regarding imprecision, such as "the maximum cost of going to a safe state is 10" and "the minimum cost of going to a halting state is 5", we will abstract away the individual transitions and only consider the minimum and maximum costs from a state to another. We will do this by constructing for any two states the set of weights that are allowed from one to the other.
First we recap the definition of a weighted transition system. A WTS is formally defined as follows:
• S is a non-empty set of states,
• →⊆ S × R ≥0 × S is the transition relation, and • ℓ : S → 2 AP is a labeling function mapping to each state a set of atomic propositions.
Note that we impose no restrictions on the state space S; it can be uncountable. Consider now a WTS as in Figure 1a . If this is a CPS, then the weights may have been obtained by measurements, simulations, or educated guesses, which may be imprecise. However, it may be that we can establish 1 as a lower bound and 10 as an upper bound on the actual weight. We could then address this problem by making more measurements and adding the results as weights on transitions, as in Figure 1b but as long as we only introduce finitely many new transitions, there will still be some imprecision. Instead, we could add infinitely many transitions, for example one for each real or rational weight that lies between 1 and 10, as in Figure 1c . However, then our WTS is no longer image-finite, so it no longer satisfies the Hennessy-Milner theorem [HM85] .
In this paper, we will address this problem by abstracting away the individual transitions, and instead consider the set of weights between a state and a set of states. Thus θ M (s) (T ) is the set of all possible weights of going from s to a state in T . We will sometimes refer to θ (s) (T ) as the image from s to T or simply as an image set.
Next, we introduce the notion of an image-compact WTS, which imposes a requirement on the image sets. Compactness in a topological space can be viewed as a generalization of the concept of finiteness, hence the notion of image-compactness is a natural generalization s t 1 10
(a) We may not know the precise weights from s to t, but we can establish 1 as a lower bound, and 10 as an upper bound. now the state s ′ in Figure 2b that has the same outgoing transitions as s except that also
which is a closed and bounded set, hence it is compact.
Note that any image-finite WTS is also image-compact, since any finite set is compact. However, an image-compact WTS is not always image-finite. In the rest of the paper, we will use the notation θ − (s) (T ) = inf θ (s) (T ) and θ + (s) (T ) = sup θ (s) (T ) with the convention that inf ∅ = −∞ and sup ∅ = ∞. Note that this convention is the opposite of the one usually adopted.
Example 2.5. Figure 3 shows a simple model of a robot vacuum cleaner that can be in a waiting state, a cleaning state, or a charging state. This is an example of a cyber-physical system where the costs of transitions are necessarily imprecise. The time it takes to recharge the batteries depends on the condition of the batteries as well as that of the charger; the time it takes to clean the room depends on how dirty the room is, and how free the floor is from obstacles; and the time it takes to reach the charger depends on where in the room the robot is when it needs to be recharged. By constructing the image sets, we can abstract away from the individual transitions. For example, we have θ (s 2 ) ({s 1 }) = {5, 10, 15}, so θ − (s 2 ) ({s 1 }) = 5 and θ + (s 2 ) ({s 1 }) = 15.
We will now establish some useful properties of image sets. We first show that the transition function is monotonic with respect to set inclusion, meaning that if T 1 is a subset of T 2 then, the image from any state s to T 1 is also a subset of the image from s to T 2 .
Lemma 2.6 (Monotonicity of θ). Let M = (S, →, ℓ) be a WTS and let T 1 and T 2 be subsets of S.
Next, we show that union and intersection distribute over image sets as one might expect.
Lemma 2.7. Let M = (S, →, ℓ) be a WTS. For any s ∈ S and T 1 , T 2 ⊆ S, it holds that
Proof.
(1) :
(2) : Similar to the first case.
As usual we would like some way of relating model states with equivalent behavior. To this end we define the notion of a bisimulation relation. The classical notion of a bisimulation relation for weighted transition systems [BvBW06] , which we term weighted bisimulation, is defined as follows.
We say that s, t ∈ S are weighted bisimilar, written s ∼ W t, iff there exists a weighted bisimulation relation R such that sRt. Weighted bisimilarity, ∼ W , is the largest weighted bisimulation relation.
Since it is our goal to abstract away from the exact weights on the transitions, the bisimulation that we will now introduce does not impose the classical zig-zag conditions [BvBW06] of a bisimulation relation, but instead require that bounds be matched for any bisimulation class.
Definition 2.9. Given a WTS M = (S, →, ℓ), an equivalence relation R ⊆ S × S on S is called a generalized weighted bisimulation relation iff for all s, t ∈ S, sRt implies
Given s, t ∈ S we say that s and t are generalized weighted bisimilar, written s ∼ t, iff there exists a generalized weighted bisimulation relation R such that sRt. Generalized weighted bisimilarity, ∼, is the largest generalized weighted bisimulation relation. In what follows, we will use bisimulation to mean generalized weighted bisimulation and bisimilarity to mean generalized weighted bisimilarity.
Example 2.10. Consider the WTS depicted in Figure 4 . It is easy to see that {s ′ , t ′ } is a ∼-equivalence class, and in fact it is the only ∼-equivalence class with ingoing transitions.
The following lemma shows that if two states are weighted bisimilar, then their image sets match exactly for any bisimulation class.
We can now show the following relationship between ∼ and ∼ W .
Theorem 2.12. Generalized weighted bisimilarity is coarser than weighted bisimilarity, i.e. ∼ W ⊆ ∼ and ∼ W = ∼ Proof. We show that any weighted bisimulation is also a bisimulation. Let M = (S, →, ℓ) be a WTS, and let R ⊆ S × S be a weighted bisimulation relation. Let s, t ∈ S. We have that ℓ(s) = ℓ(t), and by Lemma 2.11, we have that θ (s) (T ) = θ (t) (T ) for any R-equivalence class T ⊆ S. This implies that in particular θ − (s) (T ) = θ − (t) (T ) and θ + (s) (T ) = θ + (t) (T ). Hence R is a bisimulation relation.
By Ex. 2.10, the inclusion is strict.
This result is not surprising, as our bisimulation relation only looks at the extremes of the transition weights, whereas weighted bisimulation looks at all of the transition weights.
We end this section with a technical result which extends the distributive result of Lemma 2.7 to the uncountably infinite case. This result is a key part of the bisimulation invariance which we will show in the next section.
Lemma 2.13. Given any WTS M = (S, →, ℓ), it holds that if T 0 ⊇ T 1 ⊇ . . . is a countable, decreasing sequence of subsets of S, then θ (s)
Proof. We first show that θ (s)
Hence, for all i we have t ∈ T i and s r − → t. This means that
Next assume towards a contradiction that θ (s)
which is a contradiction.
Logic
In this section we introduce a modal logic which is inspired by Markovian logics [MCL12] . Our aim is that our logic should be able to capture the notion of bisimilar states as presented in the previous section, and as such it must be able to reason about the lower and upper bounds on transition weights.
Definition 3.1. The formulae of the logic L are induced by the abstract syntax
where r ∈ Q ≥0 is a non-negative rational number and p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition.
L r and M r are modal operators. An illustration of how L and M are interpreted can be seen in Figure 5 . Intuitively, L r ϕ means that the cost of transitions to where ϕ holds is at least r (see Figure 5a ), and M r ϕ means that the the cost of transitions to where ϕ holds is at most r (see Figure 5b ). We now give the precise semantics interpreted over WTSs.
Definition 3.2. Given a WTS M = (S, →, ℓ), a state s ∈ S and a formula ϕ ∈ L, the satisfiability relation |= is defined inductively as
where ϕ M = {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ} is the set of all states of M having the property ϕ.
We will omit the subscript M from ϕ M whenever the model is clear from the context. If M, s |= ϕ we say that M is a model of ϕ. A formula is said to be satisfiable if it has at least one model. We say that ϕ is a validity and write |= ϕ if ¬ϕ is not satisfiable. In addition to the operators defined by the syntax of L, we also have the derived operators such as ⊥, →, etc. defined in the usual way.
The formula L 0 ϕ has special significance in our logic, as this formula means that there exists some transition to where ϕ holds. In fact, it follows in a straightforward manner from the semantics that M, s |= L 0 ϕ if and only if θ (s) ( ϕ ) = ∅. We can therefore encode the usual box and diamond modalities in our logic in the following way.
Notice also that in general, the following schemes do not hold.
The reason that they do not hold in general is that there may be no transition to where ϕ ∧ ψ holds, i.e. ¬L 0 (ϕ ∧ ψ). If we assume L 0 (ϕ ∧ ψ), then both schemes hold, as we show in Lemma 4.1.
Example 3.3. Consider again our model of a robot vacuum cleaner depicted in Figure  3 . Perhaps we want a guarantee that it takes no more than one time unit to go from a waiting state to a charging state. This can be expressed by the formula waiting → M 1 charging, but since we know the only waiting state in our model is s 1 this can be simplified to simply checking whether M, s 1 |= M 1 charging. We thus have to check that θ + (s 1 ) ( charging ) ≤ 1. We do this by constructing the image set θ (s 1 ) ( charging ).
Next we show that our logic L is invariant under bisimulation, which is also known as the Hennessy-Milner property. In order to prove this result, we have to restrict our models to only those that are image-compact. The proof strategy follows a classical pattern: The left to right direction is shown by induction on ϕ for ϕ ∈ L. The right to left direction is shown by constructing a relation R relating those states that satisfy the same formulae and showing that this relation is a bisimulation relation.
Theorem 3.4 (Bisimulation invariance). For any image-compact WTS M = (S, →, ℓ) and states s, t ∈ S it holds that
Proof. We first show that s ∼ t implies M, s |= ϕ if and only if M, t |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L by induction on ϕ. The boolean cases are trivial. If ϕ = L r ψ, then we have θ − (s) ( ψ ) ≥ r, which implies that θ − (s) ( ψ ) = −∞. Assume towards a contradiction that θ − (t) ( ψ ) < r. It can not be the case that θ − (t) ( ψ ) = −∞, hence it follows that ψ and θ (t) ( ψ ) are non-empty, so there must exist some element t ′ ∈ ψ such that θ − (t) ( ψ ) ≤ θ − (t) ({t ′ }) < r. Since R is an equivalence relation, there must exists some R-equivalence class T such that t ′ ∈ T . This means that {t ′ } ⊆ T , so that also θ − (t) (T ) ≤ θ − (t) ({t ′ }) < r. By the induction hypothesis we have that T ⊆ ψ . Because s ∼ t, we have that θ − (s) (T ) = θ − (t) (T ) < r, so by monotonicity we get θ − (s) ( ψ ) ≤ θ − (s) (T ) < r, which is a contradiction. The M r case is handled similarly.
For the reverse direction of the biconditional we have to show that if for all ϕ ∈ L, M, s |= ϕ if and only if M, t |= ϕ then s ∼ t. To this end, we define a relation R on S as
R is clearly an equivalence relation and sRt.
It is clear that ℓ(s) = ℓ(t). Next we show that θ − (s) (T ) = θ − (t) (T ) and θ + (s) (T ) = θ + (t) (T ) for any R-equivalence class T . Let T ⊆ S be an R-equivalence class and let T denote the set of formulae satisfied by all the states in T , i.e.
Since L is countable, we can enumerate the formulae of T as T = {ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , . . .}. For i ∈ N we define ψ 0 = ϕ 0 and ψ i = ψ i−1 ∧ϕ i . We then have a decreasing sequence ψ 0 ⊇ ψ 1 ⊇ . . . such that T = i∈N ψ i .
We will first show that θ (s) (T ) = ∅ if and only if θ (t) (T ) = ∅. This follows from the fact that all the image sets are assumed to be compact, and hence we can use Lemma 2.13 and Cantor's intersection theorem to deduce that θ (s) ( ψ i ) = ∅ for some ψ i , and we then use the fact that θ (s) ( ψ i ) = ∅ iff M, s |= ¬L 0 ψ i . Now assume that θ (s) (T ) = ∅ and θ (t) (T ) = ∅. We need to show that θ − (s) (T ) = θ − (t) (T ) and θ + (s) (T ) = θ + (t) (T ). We do this by contradiction, which gives us four cases to consider:
For the case of θ − (s) (T ) < θ − (t) (T ), there exists q ∈ Q ≥0 such that
which implies that there exist j such that
and since θ − (s) ( ψ i ) ≤ θ − (s) (T ) for any i by monotonicity, we get that M, s |= L q ψ j and M, s |= L q ψ j , which is a contradiction. The other cases are handled similarly.
Metatheory
In this section we propose an axiomatization for our logic that we prove not only sound, but also complete with respect to the proposed semantics.
4.1. Axiomatic System. Let r, s ∈ Q ≥0 . Then the deducibility relation ⊢ ⊆ 2 L × L is a classical conjunctive deducibility relation, and is defined as the smallest relation which satisfies the axioms of propositional logic in addition to the axioms given in Table 1 . We will write ⊢ ϕ to mean ∅ ⊢ ϕ, and we say that a formula or a set of formulae is consistent if it can not derive ⊥.
The axioms presented in Table 1 bear some resemblance to the axiomatic systems of [MCL12] and [CLM11a] . Notably, our axiom A2 is almost identical to A2 of the these works and capture similar properties about the systems being studied, with the major difference being that we reason about transition weights whereas the aforementioned works reason about rates or probabilities of transitions. Also worth noting here is similarity between the (A1):
The axioms for our axiomatic system, where ϕ, ψ ∈ L and q, r ∈ Q.
axiom R1 of these works and R1 of our axiomatic system. A notable difference is that we do not have the additive properties of measures for disjoint sets (since we are not working with probability measures), as is captured by the axioms A3 and A4 of these works. Also, in one of the axiomatizations of [MCL12] , the axioms A2 and A2 ′ are not axioms, but can be derived from the axioms.
Axioms R2 and R3 of [MCL12] and [CLM11a] reflects the Archimedian property of rationals, and while similar axioms can be proven sound in our setting, these were not needed to show our completeness result. We suspect, however, that if we were to pursue strong completeness, infinitary axioms similar to these would be needed.
Axiom A1 captures the notion that since ⊥ is never satisfied, we can never take a transition to where ⊥ holds. Axiom A2 says that if we know some value is the lower bound for going to where ϕ holds, then any lower value is also a lower bound for going to where ϕ holds. Axiom A2 ′ is the analogue for upper bounds. Axioms A3-A4 show how L r and M r distribute over conjunction and disjunction. The version of axiom A4 where L r is replaced with M r is also sound, but as we show in Lemma 4.1, it can be proven from the other axioms. Axioms A5 and A5 ′ say that if it is not possible to take a transition to where ψ holds, then requiring that ψ also holds does not change the bounds. Axioms A6 and A7 show the relationship between L r and M r . In particular, A6 ensures that all bounds are well-formed. Notice also that the contrapositive of axiom A2 and A7 together gives us that ¬L 0 ϕ implies ¬L r ϕ and ¬M r ϕ for any r ∈ Q ≥0 . The axioms R1 and R1 ′ give a sort of monotonicity for L r and M r , and axiom R2 says that if ψ follows from ϕ, then if it is possible to take a transition to where ϕ holds, it is also possible to take a transition to where ψ holds.
We now show some of the theorems which can be deduced from the axioms. T1, T1 ′ , and T5 together complete the distributivity properties for conjunction and disjunction. T2 and T2 ′ make precise the intuitively clear idea that if two formulae are equivalent, then their upper and lower bounds should also be the same. T3 extends axiom A1 to hold for any r ≥ 0, and T4 then extends this to any ϕ which implies ⊥.
Lemma 4.1. From the axioms listed in Table 1 we can derive the following theorems:
T1 ′ : Similar to T1. T2: Suppose ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ. If ⊢ L r ϕ, then axiom A2 gives ⊢ L 0 ϕ, and axiom R2 then gives ⊢ L 0 ψ. Finally, axiom R1 then implies ⊢ L r ψ. A similar argument shows that if ⊢ L r ψ, then ⊢ L r ϕ. Hence ⊢ L r ϕ ↔ L r ψ. T2 ′ : Similar to T2. T3: From axiom A1 we know that ⊢ ¬L 0 ⊥ which, by the contrapositive of A2, implies ¬L r ⊥ for any r > 0. T4: Suppose ⊢ ϕ → ⊥. We know for any ψ ∈ L that ⊢ ⊥ → ψ and therefore ⊢ ϕ → ⊥ =⇒ ⊢ ϕ ↔ ⊥. From A1 we know that ⊢ ¬L 0 ⊥ and from T3 that ⊢ ¬L r ⊥ for any r > 0 implying, by T2, that ⊢ L r ϕ for any r ≥ 0. T5: Assume ⊢ M r (ϕ ∨ ψ). By axiom A7 we get ⊢ L 0 (ϕ ∨ ψ), and axiom A4 then
Next we prove that our axioms are indeed sound.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). ⊢ ϕ implies |= ϕ.
Proof. The soundness of each axiom is easy to show, and many of them use the distributive property from Lemma 2.7. Here we prove the soundness for a few of the more interesting axioms.
A3:
Suppose M, s |= L r ϕ ∧ L q ψ implying that M, s |= L r ϕ and M, s |= L q ψ, implying further that θ − (s) ( ϕ ) ≥ r and θ − (s) ( ψ ) ≥ q. By Lemma 2.7 we must have that
and because θ − (s) ( ϕ ) ≥ r and θ − (s) ( ψ ) ≥ q we must have
This implies that at least one of θ (s) ( ϕ ) and θ (s) ( ψ ) is non-empty. If θ (s) ( ϕ ) = ∅, then θ − (s) ( ϕ ) ≥ r, and also if θ (s) ( ψ ) = ∅, then θ − (s) ( ψ ) ≥ r, so at least one of M, s |= L r ϕ and M, s |= L r ψ must hold. Hence M, s |= L r ϕ ∨ L r ψ.
A6:
Suppose M, s |= L r+q ϕ implying that
Therefore, it cannot be the case that M, s |= M r ϕ and thus M, s |= ¬M r ϕ.
R1:
Suppose |= ϕ → ψ implying that ϕ ⊆ ψ , implying further, by the monotonicity
Since θ (s) ( ϕ ) is non-empty, we then get that
which means that M, s |= L r ϕ.
Finite Model Property and Completeness.
With our axiomatization proven sound we are now ready to present our main results, namely that our logic has the finite model property and that our axiomatization is complete.
To show the finite model property we will adapt the classical filtration method to our setting. Starting from an arbitrary formula ρ, we define a finite fragment of our logic, L[ρ], which we then use to construct a finite model for ρ. The main difference from the classical filtration method is that we must find an upper and a lower bound for the transitions in the model. For an arbitrary formula ρ ∈ L we define the following based on ρ:
• Let Q ρ ⊆ Q ≥0 be the set of all rational numbers r ∈ Q ≥0 such that L r or M r appears in the syntax of ρ. • Let Σ ρ be the set of all atomic propositions p ∈ AP such that p appears in the syntax of ρ. • The granularity of ρ, denoted as gr(ρ), is the least common denominator of all the elements in Q ρ . • The range of ρ, denoted as R ρ , is defined as
Here the granularity is used to pick out finitely many numbers in the interval. Note that we need to add 0 to R ρ whether or not ρ actually contains 0 in any of its modalities. This is because, as we have pointed out before, formulae involving L 0 have special significance in our logic.
• The modal depth of ρ, denoted as md(ρ), is defined inductively as:
Since all formulae are finite, the modal depth is always a non-negative integer. The language of ρ, denoted by L[ρ], is defined as
The idea is that Σ ρ ensures that only finitely many atomic propositions are used, R ρ ensures that only finitely many weights on the modalities are used, and md(ρ) ensures that the length of formulae is bounded. Because all formulae are finite, L[ρ] must also be finite (modulo logical equivalence), and as we shall see, it contains all the formulae that are necessary to construct a model for ρ.
In order to define the model, we need the notion of filters and ultrafilters. The following lemma establishes a relationship between L and M , that we will need to define the transition relation. The lemma is a straightforward consequence of axiom A7. Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅. Then we have ¬L 0 v ∈ u and there exists some r ∈ Q ρ such that M r v ∈ u. However, by axiom A7, this implies that L 0 v ∈ u, which is a contradiction.
We can now define the transition relation in terms of L(u, v) and M (u, v). In Figure 6 , we have illustrated the different cases that we must consider. For any of the arches in the figure, we have the following correspondence with L r and M r .
• If a number r on the real line is contained within the arch, then we have ¬L r v ∈ u and M r v ∈ u. • If a number r on the real line is to the left of the arch, then we have L r v ∈ u and ¬M r v ∈ u. • If a number r on the real line is to the right of the arch, then we have M r v ∈ u and ¬L r v ∈ u. In case (a), we therefore have L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅, so we have all the information we need to define the transition. In case (b) and (f), we have L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅, so we have enough information to define the minimum transition, but we do not know what the maximum transition is. Note that we can not simply say that the maximum transition is max Q ρ , because that would imply M max Qρ v ∈ u, but we know that M (u, v) = ∅. Hence we need to pick a number that is to the right of max Q ρ as the maximum. In case (d), we have both L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅. This implies that ¬L 0 v ∈ u, which means that there should be no transition from u to v. In case (c) and (e), we have L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅, but according to Lemma 4.5 these cases can never occur.
We therefore distinguish the following three cases in order to define the transition relation:
(1) If L(u, v) = ∅ and M (u, v) = ∅, then we add the two transitions u The following lemma tells us that these transitions are well-formed, i.e. that the lower bound on transitions is less than or equal to the upper bound. Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that max L(u, v) > min M (u, v). Then there exist q, q ′ ∈ Q ρ such that q > q ′ , L q v ∈ u and M q ′ v ∈ u. Since q > q ′ , axiom A6 gives ¬M q ′ v ∈ u, which is a contradiction.
Finally we define the labeling function ℓ ρ : U [ρ] → 2 AP for any u ∈ U [ρ] as ℓ ρ (u) = {p ∈ AP | p ∈ u}. We then have a model M ρ = (U [ρ], → ρ , ℓ ρ ), and it is not difficult to prove that M ρ is a WTS. The following lemma shows that any formula ϕ in the language of ρ that is contained in some ultrafilter u must be satisfied by the state u in the finite model
Proof. Suppose v∈ ϕ v ∈ u. Assume towards a contradiction that ¬ v ∈ u for all v ∈ ϕ . Then, since u is an ultrafilter, we must have v∈ ϕ ¬ v ∈ u, which means that ¬ v∈ ϕ v ∈ u, which is a contradiction. Hence there exists some v ′ ∈ ϕ such that v ′ ∈ u. If ψ ∈ v ′ , then ⊢ v ′ → ψ, so ψ ∈ u because u is an ultrafilter. Since v ′ ∈ ϕ , we have by assumption that ϕ ∈ v ′ , so we get ϕ ∈ u.
Suppose ϕ ∈ u, which by assumption means that u ∈ ϕ , so ⊢ u → v∈ ϕ v . Since u is an ultrafilter, we have u ∈ u, and hence v∈ ϕ v ∈ u.
We are now in a position to state and prove the truth lemma, which says that an ultrafilter satisfies a formula in our model if and only if that formula is included in the ultrafilter. Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The boolean cases are trivial. For the case ϕ = L r ψ, we proceed as follows.
( =⇒ ) Assume M ρ , u |= L r ψ, meaning that θ − (u) ( ψ ) ≥ r. It can not be the case that θ (u) ( ψ ) = ∅, because otherwise θ − (u) ( ψ ) = −∞, and we have assumed θ − (u) ( ψ ) ≥ r. It also can not be the case that ψ = ∅, because otherwise θ (u) ( ψ ) = ∅. We can partition all the ultrafilters v ∈ ψ as follows. Let E = {v ∈ ψ | L(u, v) = ∅} and N = {v ∈ ψ | L(u, v) = ∅}. We then get that E ∩ N = ∅, E ∪ N = ψ , ¬L 0 v ∈ u for all v ∈ E, and L r v ∈ u for all v ∈ N . Because u is an ultrafilter, we then have
By axiom A3, this implies
Then axiom A5 gives L r v∈ ψ v ∈ u.
By the induction hypothesis, T2, and Lemma 4.7, we then get L r ψ ∈ u.
( ⇐= ) Let L r ψ ∈ u. It follows from A1, A2, and R2 that ψ is consistent. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, ψ is non-empty. We first show that θ (u) ( ψ ) = ∅. Assume therefore towards a contradiction that θ (u) ( ψ ) = ∅. Then for all v ∈ ψ , we must have that case 3 holds, and hence L(u, v) = ∅, meaning ¬L r v ∈ u for all v ∈ ψ . Since there are finitely many v ∈ ψ , we can enumerate them as v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . Then, since u is an ultrafilter, we have ¬L r v 1 ∧ ¬L r v 2 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬L r v n ∈ u. By De Morgan's law, this is equivalent to
The contrapositive of axiom A4 then gives that
and by the induction hypothesis, T2, and Lemma 4.7, this is equivalent to ¬L r ψ ∈ u, which is a contradiction. Now assume towards a contradiction that θ − (u) ( ψ ) < r. Then there exists some v ∈ ψ such that θ − (u) ({v}) < r and case 1 or case 2 holds. In either case we have max L(u, v) < r and hence there exists some q ∈ Q ρ such that L q v ∈ u, which implies L 0 v ∈ u by axiom A2. By the induction hypothesis, ψ ∈ v, which means that ⊢ v → ψ. Axiom R1 then gives L r v ∈ u, but this is a contradiction since max L(u, v) < r.
The M r case is similar, using axiom A7 instead of A2 to derive L 0 ψ ∈ u.
Having established the truth lemma, we can now show that any consistent formula is satisfied by some finite model. Proof. Since ϕ ∈ L is consistent, the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma [LMX15b] guarantees that there exists an ultrafilter u ∈ U [ϕ] such that ϕ ∈ u. By the truth lemma, this means that M ϕ , u |= ϕ, and by construction, M ϕ is a finite model.
We are now able to state and prove our main result, namely that our axiomatization is complete.
Theorem 4.10 (Completeness). For any formula ϕ ∈ L, it holds that |= ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
Proof.
|= ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ is equivalent to ⊢ ϕ implies |= ϕ, which is equivalent to the consistency of ¬ϕ implies the existence of a model for ¬ϕ, and this is guaranteed by the finite model property.
We have thus established completeness for our logic. There is also a stronger notion of completeness, often called strong completeness, which asserts that Φ |= ϕ implies Φ ⊢ ϕ for any set of formulae Φ ⊆ L. Completeness is a special case of strong completeness where Φ = ∅. In the case of compact logics, strong completeness follows directly from completeness. However, our logic is non-compact.
Theorem 4.11. Our logic is non-compact, meaning that there exists an infinite set Φ ⊆ L such that each finite subset of Φ admits a model, but Φ does not.
Proof. Consider the set Φ = {L q ϕ | q < r} ∪ {¬L r ϕ}. For any finite subset of Φ, it is easy to construct a model. However, if M, s |= L q ϕ for all q < r where q, r ∈ Q ≥0 , then by the Archimedean property of the rationals, we also have M, s |= L r ϕ. Hence there can be no model for Φ.
Satisfiability
The finite model property gives us a way of deciding in general whether there exists a WTS and a state in that WTS which satisfies a given formula. We do so by constructing a model M ρ such that if ρ is satisfiable there exists a state Γ in M ρ such that M ρ , Γ |= ρ. The model construction closely mimics the finite model construction in Section 4.2. Indeed, while the development of Section 4.2 was syntactic, we will in this section develop its semantic counterpart and use this to give an algorithm for deciding satisfiability.
Given an arbitrary formula ρ ∈ L, we construct the language of ρ, L[ρ], in the same way as we did in Section 4.2. In this section we will not use ultrafilters as states in our model, but rather their semantic counterpart which we term maximal sets of formulae.
Definition 5.1. We say that a set Γ ⊆ L[ρ] of formulae is propositionally maximal if it satisfies the following where ϕ, ψ ∈ L[ρ]:
In addition to the conditions for propositional maximality listed in Def. 5.1, we also have another notion of maximality that we term quantitative maximality.
Definition 5.2. We say that a set Γ ⊆ L[ρ] of formulae is quantitatively maximal if it satisfies the following:
The conditions for quantitative maximality are semantic analogues of the axioms listed in Table 1 . We will say that a set Γ ⊆ L[ρ] of formulae is maximal if it is both propositionally maximal and quantitatively maximal.
Proof. To prove the first part, assume ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ. By P1, we know that either ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ or ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ. If ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ, then by P3 we must have ¬ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ψ ∈ Γ, which is a contradiction.
To prove the second part, assume ϕ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ. By P1, we know that either ϕ∨ψ ∈ Γ or ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ. If ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ Γ, then by P2 we must have ¬ϕ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ Γ, which is a contradiction.
Next we show the semantic equivalent of the rules T2 and T2 ′ .
Lemma 5.4. For arbitrary maximal set of formulae Γ ⊆ L[ρ] it holds that
Proof. Let Γ ∈ L[ρ] be a maximal set of formulae and suppose ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ Γ.
If L r ϕ ∈ Γ we have, by Q2, that L 0 ϕ ∈ Γ implying, by Q9, that L 0 ψ ∈ Γ. We thus have L r ϕ ∈ Γ and L 0 ψ ∈ Γ implying, by Lemma 5.3, that L r ϕ ∧ L 0 ψ ∈ Γ and therefore, by Q8, that L r ψ ∈ Γ.
If L r ψ ∈ Γ, then a symmetric argument shows that L r ϕ ∈ Γ. If M r ϕ ∈ Γ, then L 0 ϕ ∈ Γ by Q7, and Q9 then gives L 0 ψ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 5.3, this means that M r ϕ ∈ Γ ∧ L 0 ψ ∈ Γ, so by Q8 ′ we get M r ψ ∈ Γ.
If M r ψ ∈ Γ, we get M r ϕ ∈ Γ by a symmetric argument.
For arbitrary ϕ ∈ L[ρ], Ω ϕ denotes the collection of all maximal sets Γ in the language of ρ such that ϕ is contained in Γ, i.e. Ω ϕ = {Γ ⊆ L[ρ] | ϕ ∈ Γ and Γ is maximal} .
The following lemma is the semantic analogue of Lemma 4.7.
Lemma 5.5. For arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ L[ρ] and maximal set of formulae Γ ⊆ L[ρ] it holds that
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ L[ρ] be a formula and Γ ⊆ L[ρ] a maximal set of formulae.
Suppose Γϕ∈Ωϕ Γ ϕ ∈ Γ implying, by P3, the existence of Γ ϕ ∈ Ω ϕ such that Γ ϕ ∈ Γ implying further for all ψ ∈ Γ ϕ that ψ ∈ Γ. Because Γ ϕ ∈ Ω ϕ we must have ϕ ∈ Γ ϕ and therefore ϕ ∈ Γ.
Suppose ϕ ∈ Γ implying that Γ ∈ Ω ϕ . By P1 we must have either Γ ∈ Γ or ¬ Γ ∈ Γ. ¬ Γ ∈ Γ is equivalent to ψ∈Γ ¬ψ ∈ Γ implying, by P3, the existence of a formula ψ ∈ Γ such that ¬ψ ∈ Γ which, by P1, is a contradiction and therefore Γ ∈ Γ implying, by P1 and P2, that Γϕ∈Ωϕ Γ ϕ ∈ Γ.
As in the previous section, we define functions L and M as
which we will use to define the transitions for the model we are constructing.
Lemma 5.6. For arbitrary maximal sets of formulae Γ, Γ ′ ∈ L[ρ] it holds that
be maximal sets of formulae and suppose M (Γ, Γ ′ ) = ∅. There must exist a rational number q ∈ Q ≥0 such that q ∈ M (Γ, Γ ′ ) implying that M q Γ ′ ∈ Γ implying further, by Q7, that L 0 Γ ′ ∈ Γ and therefore L(Γ, Γ ′ ) = ∅.
Suppose towards a contradiction that max L(Γ, Γ ′ ) > min M (Γ, Γ ′ ) implying the existence of a rational number q ∈ Q ≥0 such that max L(Γ, Γ ′ ) > q > min M (Γ, Γ ′ ). q > min M (Γ, Γ ′ ) implies the existence of a rational number r ∈ Q ≥0 such that r < q and r ∈ M (Γ, Γ ′ ) which further implies M r Γ ′ ∈ Γ. max L(Γ, Γ ′ ) > q implies the existence of a rational number r ′ ∈ Q ≥0 such that r ′ > q and r ′ ∈ L(Γ, Γ ′ ) implying further that L r ′ Γ ′ ∈ Γ which, by Q6, implies ¬M r Γ ′ ∈ Γ. We thus have M r Γ ′ ∈ Γ and ¬M r Γ ′ ∈ Γ which, according to P1, is a contradiction and therefore max L(Γ, Γ ′ ) ≤ min M (Γ, Γ ′ ).
The transitions between states and their associated weights are derived in the same way as in Section 4.2. We can now formally define the WTS M ρ .
Definition 5.7. Given a formula ρ ∈ L, we define the WTS M ρ = (S ρ , → ρ , ℓ ρ ) as follows.
By Lemma 5.6 this definition is well-formed, i.e. the lower bound on transitions is less than or equal to the upper bound. The following lemma shows that any formula contained in a maximal set in the language of ρ has at least one model, namely the model M ρ . This is the semantic analogue of the truth lemma. 
Proof. Let ρ ∈ L and ϕ ∈ L[ρ] be formulae. The proof is by induction on ϕ. The boolean cases are trivial. For the case ϕ = L r ψ, we proceed as follows.
( =⇒ ) Suppose L r ψ ∈ Γ implying by Q2 that L 0 ψ ∈ Γ. Assume towards a contradiction that ψ = ∅. By induction hypothesis, we then have ¬ψ ∈ Γ. This is the same as ψ → ⊥ ∈ Γ, so by Q9 we have L 0 ⊥ ∈ Γ. However, by Q1 and P1, this is a contradiction, so ψ = ∅.
Next suppose towards a contradiction that θ (Γ) ( ψ ) = ∅ implying that ¬L 0 Γ ′ ∈ Γ for all Γ ′ ∈ ψ . Because ψ is finite, it can be enumerated as ψ = {Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n }. By P1 we must have either L r Γ 0 ∨ L r Γ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ L r Γ n ∈ Γ or ¬(L r Γ 0 ∨ L r Γ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ L r Γ n ) ∈ Γ. However, in the first case we get L 0 Γ ′ ∈ Γ for some Γ ′ by P2 and Q2, which is a contradiction. In the second case we get ¬L r ( Γ 0 ∨ Γ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ Γ n ) by Q4 and then by Q2 we get ¬L 0 ( Γ 0 ∨ Γ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ Γ n ). Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5 then give ¬L r ψ ∈ Γ which is also a contradiction by P1.
Suppose towards a contradiction that θ − (Γ) ( ψ ) < r implying the existence of Γ ′ ∈ ψ such that Γ x − → ρ Γ ′ where x < r, implying further by Lemma 5.6 that max L(Γ, Γ ′ ) < r. This implies the existence of some q ∈ R ρ , q < r such that L q Γ ′ ∈ Γ which, by Q2, implies that L 0 Γ ′ ∈ Γ. By the inductive hypothesis, we must have ψ ∈ Γ ′ and therefore we get
This means that θ (Γ) ( ψ ) = ∅ and hence ψ = ∅. We can partition ψ in the following way. Let E = {Γ ′ ∈ ψ | L(Γ, Γ ′ ) = ∅} and N = {Γ ′ ∈ ψ | L(Γ, Γ ′ ) = ∅}, then we have E ∪ N = ψ , E ∩ N = ∅, ¬L 0 Γ ′ ∈ Γ for all Γ ′ ∈ E, and L r Γ ′ ∈ Γ for all Γ ′ ∈ N . Lemma 5.3 then gives
By Q3, this implies that
By the induction hypothesis, Lemma 5.5, and Lemma 5.4, this implies that L r ψ ∈ Γ. The M r case is similar, using Q7 instead of Q2 to establish that L 0 ψ ∈ Γ.
With the preceding result, we are now able to show that any formula in the language of ρ which has a model, must also be contained in a maximal set and vice versa.
Theorem 5.9. For any formula ρ ∈ L, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) There exists a maximal set Γ ∈ 2 L[ρ] such that ρ ∈ Γ.
(2) There exists a model M = (S, →, ℓ) and a state s ∈ S such that M, s |= ρ.
(1 =⇒ 2) Suppose there exists a maximal set Γ ∈ 2 L[ρ] such that ρ ∈ Γ. We can then construct the WTS M ρ given by Def. 5.7. Then by Lemma 5.8 we have M ρ , Γ |= ρ. Hence ϕ ∈ Γ m or ψ ∈ Γ m . We have thus proven that Γ m is propositionally maximal. The fact that Γ m is quantitatively maximal can be proven in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Hence Γ m is maximal.
A consequence of Theorem 5.9 is that if we can find a maximal set Γ ∈ 2 L[ρ] such that ρ ∈ Γ, then ρ is satisfiable, and in particular it is satisfied by Γ in the WTS M ρ . Also, if we can find no such maximal set, then ρ is not satisfiable. This gives a way of deciding satisfiability of a given formula. For any formula ϕ ∈ L, the following algorithm decides whether ϕ is satisfiable, and constructs a model if it is satisfiable.
Algorithm 5.10.
(1) Construct the finite language L[ϕ].
(2) Construct the finite set 2 L[ϕ] of all subsets of L[ϕ].
(3) Go through all elements Γ ∈ 2 L[ϕ] and check whether they satisfy the conditions for maximality. If they do not, remove them. (4) Go through all the remaining maximal sets Γ and check whether ϕ ∈ Γ. If there is no such Γ, then ϕ is not satisfiable. If there is one such Γ, then ϕ is satisfiable, and the finite model M ϕ is a model for ϕ.
Example 5.11. Applying Algorithm 5.10 on the formula M 1 charging yields a model M M 1 charging with a state Γ such that M M 1 charging , Γ |= M 1 charging, thus showing the satisfiability of the formula M 1 charging. We will not go through the construction here, but consider the WTS depicted in Figure 7 . It is easy to verify that M, s 1 |= M 1 charging.
Concluding Remarks
Our contributions in this paper have been to define a new bisimulation relation for weighted transition systems (WTSs), which relates those states that have similar behavior with respect to their minimum and maximum weights on transitions, as well as an accompanying modal logic to reason about the upper and lower bounds of weights on transitions. We have shown that this logic characterizes exactly those states that are bisimilar. This characterization holds for WTSs that we call image-compact, which is a weaker requirement than image-finiteness. Furthermore, we have provided a complete axiomatization of our logic, and we have shown that it enjoys the finite model property. Based on this finite model property, we have developed an algorithm which decides the satisfiability of a formula in our logic and constructs a finite model for the formula if it is satisfiable. This work could be extended in different ways. Since our logic is non-compact, strong completeness does not follow directly from weak completeness, and hence it would be interesting to explore a strong-complete axiomatization of the proposed logic. Such an axiomatization would need additional, infinitary axioms. Examples of such axioms would be {L q ϕ | q < r} ⊢ L r ϕ and {M q ϕ | q < r} ⊢ M r ϕ, which are easily proven sound and describe the Archimedean property discussed in Theorem 4.11.
Although we have shown that our logic is expressive enough to capture bisimulation, it would also be of interest to extend our logic with a kind of fixed-point operator or standard temporal logic operators such as until in order to increase its expressivity, and hence its practical use. We envisage two ways in which such a logic could be given semantics: either by accumulating weights or by taking the maximum or minimum of weights. In the accumulating case in particular, one could also allow negative weights to model that the system gains resources.
